Route notes · Bab el-Mandeb

Bab el-Mandeb oil chokepoint: Red Sea gate, Yanbu, and Cape substitutes

The Gate of Tears is the Red Sea’s southern door — not Hormuz, not Suez. When Gulf barrels leave via Yanbu, this strait becomes the next pinch. The OilRoutes box counts AIS hulls in the rectangle, not throughput.

Published 7 September 2026 Evergreen geography · 2026 chain on the Cape note

Satellite view of the Bab el-Mandeb strait between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, with Perim Island in the eastern channel
Bab el-Mandeb — Gate of Tears — 10 April 2017. NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Space Systems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team, public domain. Landscape crop of the Commons original. Wikimedia Commons

Direct answer

What is the Bab el-Mandeb oil chokepoint? Bab el-Mandeb — Arabic for Gate of Tears — is the narrow southern door between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. A ship entering or leaving the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean has to pass here. It is not the Strait of Hormuz, the only sea exit from the Persian Gulf, and it is not the Suez Canal, the artificial cut from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. OilRoutes draws a small bounding box on the strait. The live number in that box is tracked AIS hulls, not barrels per day.

Three names get mashed together whenever a Red Sea headline hits the tape. Hormuz is the Gulf lock. Suez is the canal to the Mediterranean. Bab el-Mandeb is the southern gate that makes the Red Sea a corridor instead of a cul-de-sac. Mix them up and you fly the camera to the wrong rectangle. The eight oil-transit boxes name every rectangle; this page is the Bab el-Mandeb note.

Open the live map and fly to Bab-el-Mandeb →

Gate of Tears: the Red Sea’s southern door

The strait sits between Yemen on the Arabian side and Djibouti and Eritrea on the African side. Perim (Mayyun) sits in the eastern channel and splits the pinch into two lanes; the western channel is the wider commercial cut. North of the pinch is the Red Sea. South is the Gulf of Aden, then the Arabian Sea. A tanker that wants Suez from Asia, or that wants to leave Yanbu for the east, has to thread this door. Aqaba is a northern Red Sea cul-de-sac — not a substitute.

That is a different job from Hormuz. Hormuz is the only wet exit from the Persian Gulf. Close it and Gulf-loaded crude has no sea way out unless a producer can move barrels overland to another coast. Suez is different again: an artificial cut at the north end of the Red Sea. A ship can sit off Yanbu or in the Gulf of Suez and still be nowhere near the canal, and still be hundreds of miles from this southern gate. The three waterways form a chain, not a synonym set.

Waterway What it is What it is not
Strait of Hormuz Only sea exit from the Persian Gulf Not the Red Sea; not a Yanbu problem
Bab el-Mandeb Southern door, Red Sea ↔ Gulf of Aden Not Hormuz; not the Suez Canal
Suez Canal Artificial cut, Red Sea → Mediterranean Not the southern gate; not a Cape rounding

Ship class still matters after the gate. A laden VLCC does not treat Suez the way a Suezmax does; the map will still plot both as AIS types 80–89. VLCC, Suezmax, and Aframax is the size-class note.

Direct answer

Why does Bab el-Mandeb matter more when Hormuz is constrained? When the Persian Gulf exit is closed or too dangerous, some Saudi crude can still leave the kingdom by the East–West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea. Those barrels then have to go south through Bab el-Mandeb or north through Suez and SUMED. A Hormuz constraint can therefore raise, not lower, this strait’s weight — until Bab el-Mandeb itself is closed to those ships, at which point the remaining sea route is the Cape of Good Hope.

Yanbu is why a closed Hormuz loads this strait

Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline exists so Gulf barrels do not have to sail Hormuz. The terminal at the far end is Yanbu, on the Red Sea. If Hormuz is the problem, the workaround is: pipe west, load at Yanbu, then choose a sea door. South is Bab el-Mandeb, into the Gulf of Aden and on to Asia. North is Suez, or the SUMED pipeline to the Mediterranean, and sometimes the Cape anyway. That is the whole point of the Red Sea coast as a spare exit.

The spare exit has a catch. Barrels that skip Hormuz by pipe have only changed which wet door they need. A Yanbu loading bound for India or East Asia still wants this southern gate. A loading bound for the Mediterranean wants Suez or SUMED. A loading that can use neither still has Africa to go around. Hormuz constrained and this door open: the strait gets busier, not quieter. Both doors closed to a flag: the remaining sea route is the long one.

The 2026 record of that spare exit is already written. This page will not re-scrape it. OilPrice, citing Windward on 2 August 2026, put Yanbu loadings at about 2.47 million barrels a day in early March — a 330 percent surge versus pre-war levels — and over 4 million barrels a day by April; Wood Mackenzie had Yanbu at around 2.39 million barrels a day by June.1 Those prints live on the Cape of Good Hope reroutes note. They show the mechanism: Hormuz tight → East–West → Yanbu → this strait, or the northbound substitutes.

A Hormuz story and a Red Sea story are not interchangeable. Mid-August 2026 Hormuz traffic, on the Hormuz tanker-traffic note, was a Gulf-exit standstill — single-digit tracked crossings after the Islamabad memorandum expired.2 The Bab el-Mandeb story that same summer was a different door closing on barrels that had already escaped the Gulf by pipe.

Compare the Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb boxes on the map →

The OilRoutes box is AIS in-zone, not throughput

The map’s Bab-el-Mandeb rectangle is small and sits on the strait — roughly 12.0–13.5°N, 42.5–44.0°E, camera center near 12.6°N, 43.3°E, as defined with the other boxes in js/chokepoints.js. A hull is “in zone” when its latest AIS position falls inside that box. The integer on the stats strip and in the chokepoint panel is the number of tracked tankers (types 80–89) broadcasting there right now. It is not barrels per day. It is not a customs series. It is not a historical average flow.

Do not copy the “avg flow” string from the Bab-el-Mandeb panel into a briefing as if OilRoutes measured it. That label is not a dated EIA or Kpler print, and it is not a citeable OilRoutes series. For dated 2026 traffic and workaround volumes, use the Cape note and the Hormuz note, and follow the named outlets those pages cite.

How the camera flies, what AIS types stay on the map, and why the boxes exist at all is how the map works. Why a box is not throughput, and why dark or silent ships are missing, is how to read live AIS. How a closed door becomes days, bunkers, freight, and a crude risk premium — without inventing a dollar print — is the markets and freight note.

2026: East–West → Yanbu → BeM collapse → Suez/SUMED → Cape

The substitute chain is already on the Cape note. Read that page for dated days, hulls, Suez/SUMED volumes, and the Front Empire worked example. The sequence is one line: East–West → Yanbu → Bab el-Mandeb collapse → Suez/SUMED → Cape.

Hormuz constrained after late February. Saudi crude that can leave the Gulf by pipe loads at Yanbu. For a few months the southern door still works: Kpler’s August note, compiled on the Cape page, put weekly Saudi crude transits via Bab el-Mandeb above 3.5 million barrels a day in early July. Matt Smith at Kpler, in a 22 July Reuters piece reprinted by The Straits Times, put the June record at over four million barrels a day of Saudi crude and products just before the turn.34

Then the southern door closed to those ships. Reuters, via Gulf Business, dated a Houthi naval blockade on Saudi Arabia to 20 July and recorded no tracked Saudi oil through Bab el-Mandeb on the 15–16 August weekend.5 Kpler said Saudi crude transits via the strait had fallen close to zero in August, while Russian and Sudanese crude through the same water stayed comparatively stable — a Saudi-specific disruption, not a dead sea.3 The Houthi blockade that shut this strait to Saudi-linked cargo is recorded on Armed Conflicts’ Red Sea crisis page.

Northbound was the first substitute. Reuters reported two Saudi-to-Asia tankers reversing in the Red Sea on 21 July; analysts put the Suez-then-Cape workaround at as much as four extra weeks versus the usual eastbound run from Yanbu into the Arabian Sea.4 Suez / SUMED volumes, Windward’s Cape-hull sample, Kpler’s Front Empire 40-versus-8-day case, and Anadolu’s March swing stay on the Cape note.3167 The July–August lesson is the second substitution: Yanbu worked, Bab el-Mandeb did not.

Those are the Cape note’s figures, with the same named, dated outlets. This page adds no new scrape and no invented voyage-day total, insurance percent, or dollar-per-barrel print.

Read the Cape note for the full 2026 detour file →

Dark AIS: a quiet box is not an empty strait

A public map only plots what is broadcasting. The Cape note records that Windward and OilPrice both describe Saudi loadings and Red Sea legs running dark.61 Reuters’ Hormuz-weekend caveat — some ships may pass with transponders off — is about tracked counts, not a Bab el-Mandeb census.5 Kpler’s “more than half dark” share on the Hormuz note is a Hormuz figure; do not paste it onto this strait.2 A tanker that went silent off Yanbu may only reappear near Suez or the Cape. An in-zone count of zero is “no tracked AIS in the rectangle,” not proof that nothing is moving. How to read live AIS is the literacy note for MMSI, SOG, destination, types 80–89 and 35, and why a silent hull is still a crossing.

Direct answer

How do you use the OilRoutes map with Red Sea headlines? Open the live map. Fly to the Bab-el-Mandeb box. Treat the integer as tracked AIS tankers inside that rectangle right now — not throughput, not a daily transit ledger. Assume dark AIS undercount. Then open the sourced Cape 2026 note for the East–West → Yanbu → BeM collapse → Suez/SUMED → Cape chain, and the Hormuz 2026 note if the Gulf exit is the other half of the headline. Do not copy the panel’s average-flow string as an OilRoutes measurement.

A practical sequence when the headline says Red Sea

Demo Mode is a separate trap. Simulated hulls can sit in the Bab-el-Mandeb box while the EIA strip is still dashes, or the reverse. Do not use a demo fleet to invent a blockade. Cite OilRoutes for what the map shows and for this geography; cite the named dated sources on the Cape and Hormuz notes for 2026 traffic; never cite this article as a throughput series or a price.

Return to the live map →

Sources

Yanbu, BeM, Suez/SUMED, and Cape figures below are the same named, dated public sources already compiled on the Cape 2026 and Hormuz 2026 notes. This page does not add a new scrape and does not invent mb/d, voyage-day totals, insurance percents, or EIA prints.

  1. Irina Slav / OilPrice.com, “Saudi Oil Reroutes Hit Capacity and Security Limits,” 2 August 2026. Windward Yanbu surge; Wood Mackenzie June loadings; SUMED 2.5 million bpd and Suez ~1 million bpd capacity cited from Windward/Kpler. Compiled on the Cape note. oilprice.com
  2. The National, “Hormuz traffic falls to single digits as 60-day deadline for US-Iran MoU expires,” 17 August 2026. Kpler single-digit crossings; dark-AIS share since 28 February. Compiled on the Hormuz note. thenationalnews.com
  3. Kpler, “Saudi crude transits via Bab-el-Mandeb fall close to zero in August.” BeM collapse from above 3.5 million bpd; Suez/SUMED/Sidi Kerir figures; Front Empire ~40 days versus 8 days Yanbu–west coast India. Compiled on the Cape note. kpler.com
  4. Reuters via The Straits Times, “Asian refiners look to Suez Canal to move Saudi oil amid Houthi shipping threats,” 22 July 2026. Two reversals on 21 July; up to four extra weeks Yanbu–Asia via Suez and the Cape; Matt Smith / Kpler June BeM record above 4 million bpd. straitstimes.com
  5. Reuters via Gulf Business, “Shipping continues to grind to a halt in Hormuz Strait,” 17 August 2026. Houthi blockade dated 20 July; no tracked Saudi oil through Bab-el-Mandeb that weekend; dark-AIS caveat. gulfbusiness.com
  6. Windward, “A Second ADNOC Strike in a Week as Koh-e-Mubarak Hardens Into an Evasion Hub,” 17 August 2026. Twelve Saudi-flagged vessels on the Cape route; 4,000–6,000 nautical miles; 10–14 days. windward.ai
  7. Nuran Erkul / Anadolu Agency, “Global trade reroutes to Cape of Good Hope while traffic in Strait of Hormuz plunges 90%,” 5 March 2026. Windward Hormuz and Cape counts for 3 March; 10–20 extra days. Compiled on the Cape note. aa.com.tr